Showing posts with label charlie munger. Show all posts
Showing posts with label charlie munger. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 10, 2019

Textos Épicos: "Basically, It’s Over: A parable about how one nation came to financial ruin", Charlie Munger

In the early 1700s, Europeans discovered in the Pacific Ocean a large, unpopulated island with a temperate climate, rich in all nature’s bounty except coal, oil, and natural gas. Reflecting its lack of civilization, they named this island “Basicland.”
The Europeans rapidly repopulated Basicland, creating a new nation. They installed a system of government like that of the early United States. There was much encouragement of trade, and no internal tariff or other impediment to such trade. Property rights were greatly respected and strongly enforced. The banking system was simple. It adapted to a national ethos that sought to provide a sound currency, efficient trade, and ample loans for credit-worthy businesses while strongly discouraging loans to the incompetent or for ordinary daily purchases.
Moreover, almost no debt was used to purchase or carry securities or other investments, including real estate and tangible personal property. The one exception was the widespread presence of secured, high-down-payment, fully amortizing, fixed-rate loans on sound houses, other real estate, vehicles, and appliances, to be used by industrious persons who lived within their means. Speculation in Basicland’s security and commodity markets was always rigorously discouraged and remained small. There was no trading in options on securities or in derivatives other than “plain vanilla” commodity contracts cleared through responsible exchanges under laws that greatly limited use of financial leverage.
In its first 150 years, the government of Basicland spent no more than 7 percent of its gross domestic product in providing its citizens with essential services such as fire protection, water, sewage and garbage removal, some education, defense forces, courts, and immigration control. A strong family-oriented culture emphasizing duty to relatives, plus considerable private charity, provided the only social safety net.
The tax system was also simple. In the early years, governmental revenues came almost entirely from import duties, and taxes received matched government expenditures. There was never much debt outstanding in the form of government bonds.
As Adam Smith would have expected, GDP per person grew steadily. Indeed, in the modern area it grew in real terms at 3 percent per year, decade after decade, until Basicland led the world in GDP per person. As this happened, taxes on sales, income, property, and payrolls were introduced. Eventually total taxes, matched by total government expenditures, amounted to 35 percent of GDP. The revenue from increased taxes was spent on more government-run education and a substantial government-run social safety net, including medical care and pensions.
A regular increase in such tax-financed government spending, under systems hard to “game” by the unworthy, was considered a moral imperative—a sort of egality-promoting national dividend—so long as growth of such spending was kept well below the growth rate of the country’s GDP per person.
Basicland also sought to avoid trouble through a policy that kept imports and exports in near balance, with each amounting to about 25 percent of GDP. Some citizens were initially nervous because 60 percent of imports consisted of absolutely essential coal and oil. But, as the years rolled by with no terrible consequences from this dependency, such worry melted away.
Basicland was exceptionally creditworthy, with no significant deficit ever allowed. And the present value of large “off-book” promises to provide future medical care and pensions appeared unlikely to cause problems, given Basicland’s steady 3 percent growth in GDP per person and restraint in making unfunded promises. Basicland seemed to have a system that would long assure its felicity and long induce other nations to follow its example—thus improving the welfare of all humanity.
But even a country as cautious, sound, and generous as Basicland could come to ruin if it failed to address the dangers that can be caused by the ordinary accidents of life. These dangers were significant by 2012, when the extreme prosperity of Basicland had created a peculiar outcome: As their affluence and leisure time grew, Basicland’s citizens more and more whiled away their time in the excitement of casino gambling. Most casino revenue now came from bets on security prices under a system used in the 1920s in the United States and called “the bucket shop system.”
The winnings of the casinos eventually amounted to 25 percent of Basicland’s GDP, while 22 percent of all employee earnings in Basicland were paid to persons employed by the casinos (many of whom were engineers needed elsewhere). So much time was spent at casinos that it amounted to an average of five hours per day for every citizen of Basicland, including newborn babies and the comatose elderly. Many of the gamblers were highly talented engineers attracted partly by casino poker but mostly by bets available in the bucket shop systems, with the bets now called “financial derivatives.”
Many people, particularly foreigners with savings to invest, regarded this situation as disgraceful. After all, they reasoned, it was just common sense for lenders to avoid gambling addicts. As a result, almost all foreigners avoided holding Basicland’s currency or owning its bonds. They feared big trouble if the gambling-addicted citizens of Basicland were suddenly faced with hardship.
And then came the twin shocks. Hydrocarbon prices rose to new highs. And in Basicland’s export markets there was a dramatic increase in low-cost competition from developing countries. It was soon obvious that the same exports that had formerly amounted to 25 percent of Basicland’s GDP would now only amount to 10 percent. Meanwhile, hydrocarbon imports would amount to 30 percent of GDP, instead of 15 percent. Suddenly Basicland had to come up with 30 percent of its GDP every year, in foreign currency, to pay its creditors.
How was Basicland to adjust to this brutal new reality? This problem so stumped Basicland’s politicians that they asked for advice from Benfranklin Leekwanyou Vokker, an old man who was considered so virtuous and wise that he was often called the “Good Father.” Such consultations were rare. Politicians usually ignored the Good Father because he made no campaign contributions.
Among the suggestions of the Good Father were the following. First, he suggested that Basicland change its laws. It should strongly discourage casino gambling, partly through a complete ban on the trading in financial derivatives, and it should encourage former casino employees—and former casino patrons—to produce and sell items that foreigners were willing to buy. Second, as this change was sure to be painful, he suggested that Basicland’s citizens cheerfully embrace their fate. After all, he observed, a man diagnosed with lung cancer is willing to quit smoking and undergo surgery because it is likely to prolong his life.
The views of the Good Father drew some approval, mostly from people who admired the fiscal virtue of the Romans during the Punic Wars. But others, including many of Basicland’s prominent economists, had strong objections. These economists had intense faith that any outcome at all in a free market—even wild growth in casino gambling—is constructive. Indeed, these economists were so committed to their basic faith that they looked forward to the day when Basicland would expand real securities trading, as a percentage of securities outstanding, by a factor of 100, so that it could match the speculation level present in the United States just before onslaught of the Great Recession that began in 2008.
The strong faith of these Basicland economists in the beneficence of hypergambling in both securities and financial derivatives stemmed from their utter rejection of the ideas of the great and long-dead economist who had known the most about hyperspeculation, John Maynard Keynes. Keynes had famously said, “When the capital development of a country is the byproduct of the operations of a casino, the job is likely to be ill done.” It was easy for these economists to dismiss such a sentence because securities had been so long associated with respectable wealth, and financial derivatives seemed so similar to securities.
Basicland’s investment and commercial bankers were hostile to change. Like the objecting economists, the bankers wanted change exactly opposite to change wanted by the Good Father. Such bankers provided constructive services to Basicland. But they had only moderate earnings, which they deeply resented because Basicland’s casinos—which provided no such constructive services—reported immoderate earnings from their bucket-shop systems. Moreover, foreign investment bankers had also reported immoderate earnings after building their own bucket-shop systems—and carefully obscuring this fact with ingenious twaddle, including claims that rational risk-management systems were in place, supervised by perfect regulators. Naturally, the ambitious Basicland bankers desired to prosper like the foreign bankers. And so they came to believe that the Good Father lacked any understanding of important and eternal causes of human progress that the bankers were trying to serve by creating more bucket shops in Basicland.
Of course, the most effective political opposition to change came from the gambling casinos themselves. This was not surprising, as at least one casino was located in each legislative district. The casinos resented being compared with cancer when they saw themselves as part of a long-established industry that provided harmless pleasure while improving the thinking skills of its customers.
As it worked out, the politicians ignored the Good Father one more time, and the Basicland banks were allowed to open bucket shops and to finance the purchase and carry of real securities with extreme financial leverage. A couple of economic messes followed, during which every constituency tried to avoid hardship by deflecting it to others. Much counterproductive governmental action was taken, and the country’s credit was reduced to tatters. Basicland is now under new management, using a new governmental system. It also has a new nickname: Sorrowland.
Escrito por Charlie Munger em 19/02/2010

Tuesday, July 16, 2019

A Malha dos Modelos Mentais



"Bem, a primeira regra é que você não tem como saber alguma coisa se você só lembra fatos isolados e tenta martelar de volta. Se os fatos não existem juntos em uma teoria de malhas, você não os tem de uma forma que dê pra usar. Você tem que ter os modelos na sua cabeça. E você tem que organizar sua experiência tanto indireta quanto direta nessa malha de modelos. Você deve ter notado alguns estudantes que apenas tentam lembrar e martelar de volta aquilo que é lembrado. Bem, eles falham na escola e na vida. Você precisa organizar a experiência em uma malha de modelos na sua cabeça.", Munger


No último post eu recomendei a leitura de um discurso de Munger por que eu considero esse discurso um verdadeiro presente. A idéia era falar apenas sobre negócios mas Munger foi muito além e nos ofereceu um framework para melhorar nossa tomada de decisões. Ele explicou sobre a Malha dos Modelos Mentais, uma forma de tornar a complexidade do mundo um pouco mais administrável e melhorar nossa qualidade de pensamento. 

A Malha dos Modelos Mentais faz parte da minha vida há algum tempo, sem que eu nunca tivesse conseguido formaliza-la. Ela veio da minha compulsão por fazer anotações. Começou antes da faculdade e vai até os dias de hoje. Eu observo um comportamento e tomo nota. As vezes eu tento explicar o comportamento mas as vezes não tem nada pra ser explicado. Tomo nota de uma forma ou de outra.

Com o tempo eu fui percebendo que os comportamentos se repetiam. Não só com os outros como comigo também. E essa é a importância de ter esses modelos mentais mapeados. Podemos evitar comportamentos que, embora automáticos, nos prejudicam. E claro, também podemos entender melhor as outras pessoas. Aos poucos nós vamos nos educando em torno dos Modelos Mentais e passamos a pensar de forma diferente.

Munger vai um pouco além do meu básico exercício de anotações sobre o comportamento humano. Segundo Munger, modelos fundamentais de diferentes áreas do conhecimento como engenharia, psicologia e biologia devem se encaixar nessa Malha dos Modelos Mentais para evitar uma visão de túnel. Como na fábula do cego e do elefante, uma visão limitada prejudica a percepção do todo. E a Malha dos Modelos Mentais ajuda a eliminar esses pontos cegos.

“’Você precisa saber as grandes idéias das grandes disciplinas e usá-las com frequencia – todas elas, e não só algumas. A maioria das pessoas é treinada em um só modelo – economia, por exemplo – e tentam resolver todos os problemas de um só jeito. Você conhece o velho ditado: para o homem com um martelo, o mundo parece um prego. Essa é uma maneira estúpida de lidar com os problemas.”, Munger



Nesse blog eu vou abordar alguns dos meus modelos mentais. O primeiro deles já deve ser o tema do próximo post. Cabe reforçar que os meus modelos mentais são MEUS, são a forma como EU enxergo o mundo. São resultado de anos de observações, leituras e experiências pessoais. E sim, me servem bem na hora de investir já que sempre recorro ao meu  checklist de vieses antes de fazer algum investimento.

Eu não recomendo a ninguém que copie os meus modelos mentais. Vejo muita gente repetindo a idéia dos modelos mentais e copiando listas de modelos já prontas. É uma maneira pobre de lidar com o conceito. É importante que você crie os seus próprios modelos. Por que? Porque vai força-lo a prestar atenção à sua volta e, com isso, aprender a pensar diferente.

Não vou mentir: a construção de modelos mentais é trabalhosa e não acaba nunca. É basicamente um projeto de uma vida, que primeiro toma forma e depois vai sendo moldado aos poucos. Mas como tudo que vale a pena, é uma agradável jornada.

Stay cool,
Don Black

Friday, July 12, 2019

Textos Épicos: "A Lesson on Elementary Worldly Wisdom", Charlie Munger 1994

Esse vai ser o primeiro post do blog em que o conteúdo não vai ser meu. Sorte sua, já que o conteúdo vai ser de ninguém menos do que Charlie Munger.

Ainda que eu não precise, eu faço questão de me explicar. Os gigantes dos investimentos produziram uma vasta quantidade de materiais épicos ao longo dos anos. Alguns são largamente conhecidos enquanto outros nem tanto.

Toda vez que vejo alguém lendo algum relatório de sell side ou alguma coluna da parte de investimentos de algum jornal de grande circulação eu penso no custo de oportunidade desse leitor. Afinal de contas, lá se foi um tempo que poderia ter sido bem gasto lendo um desses textos épicos que pouca gente conhece. Sendo assim, pretendo postar alguns desses textos aqui, para download e apreciação.

Já adianto meu pedido de desculpas pois alguns desses textos serão em inglês. Eu sei que muita gente sabe inglês mas ainda assim isso contraria o objetivo do blog de propagar o conhecimento entre brasileiros.

Por isso faço questão de, aos poucos, ir traduzindo todos os textos para postar aqui. Se você puder me ajudar nessa empreitada de tradução, peço que por favor entre em contato comigo. Já adianto que não haverá nenhuma compensação financeira mas vou dar os devidos créditos pelo trabalho.

Sem mais delongas, o primeiro texto que vou postar é de um discurso fenomenal que Charlie Munger deu em 1994 na USC Business School. Esse texto foi escolhido como primeiro por que, além de ser fantástico, vai introduzir a idéia da Malha de Modelos Mentais, tema do próximo post. Segue o link:

Charlie Munger: A Lesson on Elementary Worldly Wisdom - Speech Given at USC Business School, 1994